Developed from a one-day symposium at the University of Tilburg, this collection of papers explores the semiotic foundations of legislation as viewed from jurisprudential, institutional and sociological perspectives. They pose such questions as: the audience of legislation; the relations between legislative and judicial discourse; the contributions of speech act theory; the effectiveness of legislation and its meaning in non-legal discourse; and the creation of a supra-national form of constitutional discourse, that of Europe.

Finally, some brief responses to the kind observations on my book by the three respondents, with a view to possible improvements of the model I have proposed. I began the outline of my analytical model by confronting it with that of Teubner, as mentioned in the response of Willem Witteveen. As Witteveen states, it is my goal and ambition to replace the flow model of communication (Teubner) with something new. Witteveen maintains that Teubner has already discarded the flow model of (...) communication. However, even Witteveen acknowledges (along with many others) that in the autopoiesis theory Teubner developed a one-sided communication model: that of the flow of legal rules between different social subsystems. The legal system is one such social subsystem, rule addressees are other social subsystems. Teubner’s model of legal messages concentrates basically on legal rules which aim to produce factual results in the form of behaviour conforming to the rules. The flow of legal messages takes pl .. (shrink)

This article develops a model first proposed in my book Jurisprudence and communication [67]. It takes as its starting point the generally conception that legal rules are valid norms, involving a normative content and expressing themselves in reality through observable conduct. This dualistic character of law is central. Law is both fiction and factual, ideal and real. But the viewpoint that a legal rule is a manifestation of validity in reality, through empirical acts, raises the question how rules as (valid) (...) fictions can be known and understood in their linguistic form. How is meaning attributed to the legal words and how do these words relate to the world of fact? Taking an institutional-pragmatic approach as a starting point, an analytical model is created that can be used as an instrument for the relationship between legal rules as thought objects existing only in the mind, and legal rules as observable conduct. This model seeks to revise the classical models of legal communication that basically focus on the unilateral flow of legal information between ‘senders and receivers’ and their claim of linear causality between rules and conduct. The model here constructed in the theoretical part is then applied to several case studies, in order to analyze the construction of meaning in actual use. Two fundamental rights—the older codified in 1798 and the more recent codified in 1983—in the Dutch Constitution have been analyzed using the model as an instrument. Further, the remarkable shifts in article 96 of the Constitution, the declaration of war, and its consequences, resulting in a new category of war—the armed conflict—have been analyzed, as well as the phenomenon of ‘peacekeeping missions’ involving actual warfare. The new war terminology has created vagueness with respect to the clear-cut division between war and peace, which has been reflected in several cases before Court, including the Eric O. case. The present analysis of the case studies indicates that the model was not in all cases completely tailored to the facts: for example, in the case study on article 96 a broad spectrum of observable legal and non-legal actors dominated the facts in such a way that the model did not fully cover it. The observations on my book by the three respondents in this special issue have contributed to the adaptation and extension of the model. In the Postscript my responses suggest some ways in which their ideas can be implemented. (shrink)

In institutional legal theory, norms and facts are reciprocally operating elements: an interplay in which meaning construction is closely connected with acting: the pragmatic understanding of legal language in terms of its uses. With the semiotic elements of institutional theory, extended by the notion of ‘semiotic groups’, an analytical framework can be constructed to analyze a case study on the shifts in the concept of war which have taken place since the 1945 UN Charter and in the aftermath of 9/11. (...) The semiotic aspects of the institutional approach can offer insight into the complexity of the processes of meaning attribution in the field of law and war. (shrink)